UNITED NATIONS **S**

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S/1998/922
7 October 1998
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ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 6 OCTOBER 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SUDAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith, for your attention, a telegram addressed to you and the members of the Security Council from Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sudan, concerning the Ugandan-Eritrean military attack on Sudanese territory.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Elfatih ERWA
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 6 October 1998 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sudan addressed to the President of the Security Council

1. I refer to the previous letters addressed to you by the Government of the Sudan, the most recent dated 13 March 1997 (S/1997/223), giving details of repeated Ugandan attacks on the southern border of the Sudan and blatant interference by Uganda in the internal affairs of the Sudan through the stirring up of separatist conflicts that threaten the country's national unity. I regret to inform you that the Ugandan Government continues to carry out attacks against and threaten the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Sudan.

2. In recent weeks the Government of the Sudan has continued to observe Ugandan military movements hostile to the Sudan, such as the Ugandan Government push on 3 September 1998 using the 5th infantry brigade supported by 20 T-55 main battle tanks and 10 armoured cars from the Qulu region to the Katqum region inside Ugandan territory and thence to Sudanese territory. This incident took place on the same day that the rebel leader John Garang arrived in the Ugandan capital, Kampala. Top-ranking Ugandan military leaders such as Major General Salim Salih have also visited areas on the southern Sudanese-Ugandan border that are outside Sudanese Government control.

3. On 14 September 1998 the above-mentioned forces, supported by Eritrean forces, began to attack Sudanese armed forces using heavy artillery and weapons. The attack came from three areas along the northern Ugandan border: the first near Liria, the second in the direction of Nanqala and the third near Jabalayn. The object of this attack was to menace the regional capital, Juba, and the two towns of Kabwiti and Turit in eastern Equatoria Province.

4. Our armed forces were able to repel the attack and drive away the invaders. Many Ugandan soldiers were taken prisoner and others killed. Our forces captured a number of enemy tanks, one of which, No. 603, was in perfect condition and had its complete crew on board. They also captured ammunition and small arms and removed military insignia from the uniforms of Ugandan casualties. All of this will be made public in due course.

5. I am sure you have been following the efforts of the Sudanese Government, the international community and the States of the region to bring peace to the Sudan. The Government of the Sudan considers that this Ugandan-Eritrean attack is likely to prolong the present war and increase the humanitarian suffering of the people of the region. In bringing this information to your attention, therefore, the Sudanese Government is hopeful that the Security Council will fully shoulder its responsibility to maintain international peace and security and take note of my Government's request that Uganda and Eritrea cease their aggression, withdraw their forces from Sudanese territory and prevent them from repeating such attacks. Our information affirms that the Government of Uganda is determined to send additional troops, led by the Ugandan 7th Brigade, into Sudanese territory, with a view to providing support to rebel forces in the southern Sudan.

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LETTER DATED 6 OCTOBER 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF QATAR TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to inform you that the Annual Coordination Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, convened at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 1 October 1998, considered, among other matters, the latest developments in Kosovo province.

The meeting participants expressed their deep concern over the gravity of the situation in the area affecting international peace and security and adopted a Declaration on Kosovo, the text of which is presented in the annex to the present letter for your perusal. I would draw attention to paragraph 4 of the Declaration, which calls upon the Security Council to convene an emergency meeting to take the necessary measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

I would be grateful if the present letter and the enclosed Declaration on Kosovo could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nassir Abdul Aziz AL-NASSER
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of the State of Qatar
Chairman of the Islamic Group

Annex

Declaration on Kosovo issued by the Annual Coordination Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on 11 Jumada II, 1419H (1 October 1998)

The Coordination Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), held in New York on 11 Jumada II, 1419H (1 October 1998),

Having discussed with deep concern the latest developments in Kosovo province,

Expressing its deep concern over these grave developments, which affect international peace and security,

1. Expresses its full solidarity with the inhabitants of Kosovo province;

2. Strongly condemns the policy of ethnic cleansing pursued by the Serbian Government against the inhabitants of the province;

3. Mandates the OIC Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina to also follow up the situation in Kosovo;

4. Calls upon the Security Council to convene an emergency meeting to take the necessary measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to ensure the protection of the lives and property of the inhabitants of the province, and to compel the Serbian authorities to desist from their repressive practices against them and to settle the crisis through peaceful means;

5. Urges member States and the international community to extend all possible humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of the inhabitants of Kosovo province.

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LETTER DATED 5 OCTOBER 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BURUNDI TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the opening statement at the press conference given to the United Nations press corps by the President of the Republic of Burundi, Mr. Pierre Buyoya, on 22 September 1998.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and of its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Gamaliel NDARUZANIYE
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-29610 (E) 071098 071098

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Annex

New York
22 September 1998

Press conference given by the President of Burundi
on 22 September 1998

Opening statement

1. On the occasion of the fifty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly, it is gratifying to take up and comment on various questions of concern to our country, our region and our continent in an effort to inform international opinion and encourage the positive action which is necessary.

2. After having banished the spectre of genocide which threatened Burundi a little over two years ago, we have embarked on a major peace process intended to bring about a political solution on the basis of which lasting reconciliation in Burundi can be built. This peace process has two elements: an internal initiative and an external dimension.

3. The internal peace process constitutes the cornerstone of reconciliation since peace in Burundi is primarily the concern of the people of Burundi themselves. This internal initiative also constitutes the basis for external peace talks (Arusha).

4. In June 1998 the internal peace process entered a decisive phase. A joint initiative by the Government and Parliament has recently led to the signing of a significant agreement on the political platform of the transition regime, a fundamental text defining the missions of the transition institutions in terms of the fundamental questions facing the people of Burundi: peace, democracy, genocide, justice, security, victims and the economy.

5. At the conclusion of a process of internal negotiation between the Government and National Assembly (Parliament) a constitutional act on the transition was promulgated in June. This resolved the constitutional impasse, a broadly based Government has been established, and an expanded Parliament is ready to start its work.

6. Today this domestic partnership is engaged in strengthening peace in the provinces of the country while preparing for the third round of negotiations with the Burundian diaspora, which, after lengthy preparation, began at Arusha on 15 June 1998.

7. However, despite all the efforts of the people, Parliament and Government of Burundi, the illegal and unjust sanctions imposed on 31 July 1996 against Burundi represent the most dangerous threat to the peace process, reconciliation and stability in Burundi. Decided in haste, devoid of any legal, political or moral foundation, these measures are subjecting the most vulnerable segments of the population to total destitution and are undermining the peace effort. This, quite simply, is nonsensical.

8. The conditions previously set for the lifting of sanctions have all been met, despite which all kinds of pretexts have been raised. We would thus wish to urge the authors of the sanctions to assume their responsibilities, meet their commitments and end this constraint without further conditions.

9. We invite the international community to be consistent and to exert all necessary pressure in this regard. In a spirit of pragmatism we call on our partners to resume cooperation with Burundi, following the example of those who support our country. We need support from all our friends for reconstruction and the rehabilitation of victims.

10. Burundi is in the centre of a region in turmoil: the Great Lakes Region. The current conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a matter of great concern to us. We wish to recall here that Burundi is in no way involved in this war. We have no claims against the Congo. In common with other neighbouring countries, Burundi is likely to experience a negative fallout from this situation, which is of critical importance to security and the economy. The Government of Burundi continues to favour a peaceful settlement based on dialogue. It will do its utmost to preserve Burundi's national interests.

11. The economic future of the Great Lakes Region is closely linked to the ability to form viable major economic units. Yet regional integration requires stability and the restoration of security. It supposes an end to blockades and economic embargoes which, by definition, are the very negation of integration. Integration will also necessitate extirpating the ideology of genocide, the disarmament of militias, and respect for the sovereignty and independence of States.

12. Before concluding my introductory statement, I wish to emphasize yet again that Burundi has firmly embarked on the path of peace. We appeal to the international community for support for the internal partnership for peace - a precondition for the external initiative. Burundi must no longer be treated in an infantile, unjust, and inequitable manner. Support, to be effective, must come now - this is the time - this is the time to lift sanctions, and to give Burundi economic support to provide the peace process under way in our country with solid underpinnings.

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LETTER DATED 7 OCTOBER 1998 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

In accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 689 (1991) and in the light of your report of 24 September 1998 (S/1998/889), the members of the Security Council have reviewed the question of termination or continuation of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) and its modalities of operation.

I have the honour to inform you that the members of the Security Council concur with your recommendation that UNIKOM be maintained. In accordance with resolution 689 (1991), they have decided to review the question once again by 7 April 1999.

(Signed) Jeremy GREENSTOCK
President of the Security Council

98-29680 (E) 071098

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LETTER DATED 6 OCTOBER 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF QATAR TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

As chairman of the Islamic Group to the United Nations, I have the honour to inform you that the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference held their annual coordination meeting on Thursday, 1 October 1998, at United Nations Headquarters in New York. The question of Lockerbie, inter alia, was discussed at the meeting.

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs expressed their satisfaction that the United States of America and the United Kingdom had accepted the proposal by regional and international organizations for the trial of the two suspects to be held in a third, neutral country (Netherlands). The Ministers call upon the two countries to enter into direct negotiations with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya with a view to the implementation of Security Council resolution 1192 (1998), including trial arrangements and security measures relating to the two suspects.

While welcoming the Libyan position, which is characteristically flexible and realistic in its approach to the issue, the Ministers affirmed their full and utter support for the following legitimate Libyan requests with a view to putting an end both to the serious physical and moral harm incurred by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and to the suffering of its people as a result of the sanctions imposed on it.

These demands are:

1. That agreement should be reached on guarantees that the two suspects will not be extradited, transferred or moved to the United States of America or the United Kingdom for any reason and that they will serve their term of punishment, in the event of their conviction, in the Netherlands or the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

2. That agreement should be reached on clarification regarding the witnesses and their identification by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

3. That agreement should be reached on guarantees of the legal, religious, personal, social and medical rights of the two suspects throughout the various stages of the trial, as well as on guarantees of their security and safety during their travel to and from the Netherlands and during their stay there;

4. That the start of the trial should be the end of this question, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya having responded to all requests of the Security Council, and that sanctions should be finally lifted as soon as the two suspects appear before the court.

We request the Security Council to take the above into account in its consideration of this matter. We should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nassir Abdul-Aziz AL-NASSER
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Qatar
Chairman of the Islamic Group

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7 October 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 OCTOBER 1998 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 7 October 1998, which I have received from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

98-29571 (E) 081098

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Annex

Letter dated 7 October 1998 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Secretary-General

In paragraph 16 of its resolution 1051 (1996) of 27 March 1996, the Security Council called for the consolidation of the periodic requirements for progress reports under resolutions 699 (1991), 715 (1991) and 1051 (1996), and requested the Director General to submit such consolidated reports every six months to the Council, commencing on 11 April 1996.

It would therefore be appreciated if you could arrange to transmit to the President of the Security Council the enclosed sixth consolidated semi-annual report under paragraph 16 of resolution 1051 (1996). I remain available for any consultations you or the Council may wish to have.

(Signed) Mohamed ELBARADEI

Appendix

Sixth consolidated report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996)

INTRODUCTION

1. In paragraph 16 of resolution 1051 (1996), adopted on 27 March 1996, the Security Council called for the consolidation of the periodic progress reports required under resolutions 699 (1991), 715 (1991) and 1051 (1996), and requested the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to submit such a consolidated report every six months to the Council, commencing on 11 April 1996.

2. The Director General submits herewith the sixth[a] such consolidated report under paragraph 16 of resolution 1051 (1996).

ONGOING MONITORING AND VERIFICATION

Monitoring inspections

3. In the period under review (1 April-1 October 1998), the IAEA Nuclear Monitoring Group carried out 243 monitoring inspections at some 137 locations, 37 of which were carried out at locations not previously inspected. The number of inspections carried out under the Agency's ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) plan since the Nuclear Monitoring Group was established in August 1994 now totals almost 1,540. The majority of those inspections were carried out with no prior announcement; a number of them were conducted in cooperation with the monitoring groups of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). No indication of prohibited materials, equipment or activities was detected during the inspections.

4. Until 5 August 1998, IAEA and UNSCOM continued their implementation of a joint programme of inspection of Iraqi sites that are deemed to have capabilities suitable for conducting work on some aspect of weapons of mass destruction, notwithstanding the lack of evidence or indication of such work. The carrying out of inspections at "capable sites" on a regular basis contributes to the effectiveness of the OMV plan in its ability to detect any attempt to conduct activities prohibited by Security Council resolutions. The current number of inspections at "capable sites" totals some 85. No indication of prohibited equipment, materials or activities has been detected in the course of those inspections.

5. On 5 August, Iraq announced that it was suspending its cooperation with UNSCOM and IAEA. Although IAEA received no formal notification or explanation from Iraq of the suspension of cooperation, it obtained the following information through contact with the Director General of Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate:

(a) Iraq will continue to facilitate OMV inspections at sites for which it routinely provides declarations under the OMV plan;

(b) Iraq will continue to allow IAEA access to locations for the purpose of collecting environmental samples or carrying out radiation surveys;

(c) Iraq will not permit access to capable sites or indeed to any sites other than those for which Iraq routinely provides declarations under the OMV plan;[6]

(d) Iraq will not cooperate in any activity involving investigation of its clandestine nuclear programme.

6. The Agency's OMV plan, which Iraq formally accepted on 26 November 1993, obliges Iraq to accept unconditionally all of the rights of IAEA enumerated in the plan. The rights include full and free access at any time to all sites, facilities, areas, locations, activities, materials and other items, including documentation, and to all persons and all information that, in the Agency's judgement, may be necessary for its OMV activities. Iraq's restriction of monitoring inspections to predefined sites limits the Agency's right of full and free access. As a consequence, IAEA is unable, through capable site inspections, to ensure that prohibited activities are not being carried out in Iraq, free from the risk of detection through direct inspection measures. Iraq's refusal to address any matters related to its clandestine nuclear programme constitutes a further limitation of the Agency's right of full and free access, specifically to information. Thus, IAEA is unable to investigate further its remaining questions and concerns about Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. The OMV plan is an integral whole that can be meaningfully implemented only in its entirety. Iraq's suspension of cooperation significantly reduces the effectiveness of OMV and the level of assurance provided through ongoing monitoring and verification.

Other ongoing monitoring and verification activities

7. The eleventh radiometric survey of Iraq's main watercourses was carried out from 14 to 28 April. The results of this and previous surveys have shown no indication that Iraq had carried out any prohibited nuclear activities, but, as previously reported, they have confirmed the sensitivity of the technology by detecting Iraq's permitted use of radioisotopes in medical applications.

8. Routine interviews of key Iraqi personnel have continued, but difficulties have been encountered in locating some personnel due to their stated transfer from government jobs to the private sector. Actions are in hand with the Iraqi counterpart to maintain a register of the places of work of key personnel. The interview process is further complicated by Iraq's current suspension of cooperation with IAEA, which has included instructions to Iraqi personnel to not respond to any questions relating to Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme.

9. The third helicopter gamma survey campaign of former Iraqi nuclear-related installations was carried out from 20 May to 12 June. The 1998 campaign included overflights of sites known to have been involved in Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme as well as test flights to verify the technical performance of

the sensor system in various configurations. For the first time, near-real-time analysis capabilities were available, permitting the investigation and resolution, by follow-up inspections on the ground, of anomalies detected during flights. Sites overflown in both 1997 and 1998 showed no statistically significant measurement differences from year to year that might indicate undeclared activities.

10. Work continues on the updating and expansion of the technological components of OMV activities and procedures. Efforts are also under way to consolidate a number of technical measures into a wide-area environmental monitoring programme. In this regard, Iraq is providing the necessary practical and technical support, particularly in connection with the Agency's installation and operation of air-sampling equipment.

Declarations under the ongoing monitoring and verification plan

11. Paragraph 22 and annex 2 of the OMV plan (S/22872/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Corr.1) require Iraq to provide semi-annual declarations, in January and July, on the current use of certain facilities, installations and sites, including those formerly involved in its clandestine nuclear programme, and on changes during the previous six months regarding the inventory and location of materials, equipment and isotopes identified in annexes 3 and 4 of the plan.

12. Iraq's declarations of nuclear material transactions and inventories covering the period from 1 January 1989 to 31 December 1991 were reviewed in detail with the counterpart to further clarify nuclear material flows and inventories at the principal locations at which nuclear material was used or stored during that period. The Iraqi counterpart has provided revised data, which appear to take into account many of the requested clarifications, but some inconsistencies remain to be resolved.

13. Based on the Agency's evaluation of the declarations received in July 1998, there remains outstanding the repeatedly requested implementation by Iraq of quality assurance measures to deal with generic problems regarding accuracy, completeness and internal consistency. In this connection, members of the IAEA Action Team will visit Iraq in October to discuss the adequacy of Iraq's July declarations and to clarify the remaining inconsistencies in Iraq's nuclear material declarations. IAEA experience indicates that the goal of accurate and complete declarations will be achieved only if Iraq assigns additional technical personnel to the task.

Release, relocation and change of use of equipment, material and facilities

14. In the period under review, Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate submitted 27 requests to IAEA for approval of the release or relocation of equipment and materials or of the change of use of monitored buildings. Such requests are processed in consultation with UNSCOM. Twenty-four of the 27 requests have been approved, and 3 are awaiting the provision of additional information by the Iraqi counterpart. Items for which release, relocation or change of use is approved remain subject to ongoing monitoring and verification at a frequency commensurate with their significance.

Export/import mechanism

15. The export/import monitoring mechanism for Iraq, jointly administered by UNSCOM and IAEA, has, since October 1996, received notifications of some 190 transactions involving the intended export to Iraq of items identified in the annexes to the respective OMV plans. Seven of those notifications involved items identified in annex 3 to the Agency's OMV plan.

The adoption by Iraq of measures to implement its obligations

16. Paragraph 34 of the Agency's OMV plan requires that Iraq adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions and enact penal laws to secure their enforcement. In discussions with the leader of the IAEA Iraq Action Team, Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Tariq Aziz, stated in July that Iraq acknowledged the requirements to adopt the necessary measures and to enact the penal laws, and that it planned to satisfy the requirements before October 1998. No notification has been received to date of Iraq's progress in that regard.

STATUS OF THE AGENCY'S VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ

17. As reported in detail in the progress report dated 8 October 1997 (document S/1997/779), and based on all credible information available to date, the Agency's verification activities in Iraq have resulted in the evolution of a technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. The verification activities have revealed no indications that Iraq had achieved its programme objective of producing nuclear weapons or that Iraq had produced more than a few grams of weapon-usable nuclear material or had clandestinely acquired such material. Furthermore, there are no indications that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the production of weapon-usable nuclear material of any practical significance. In February 1994, IAEA completed the removal from Iraq of all weapon-usable nuclear material - essentially research reactor fuel - under IAEA safeguards.

18. In the same report, IAEA further reported that there were no indications of significant discrepancies between the technically coherent picture that had evolved of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme and the information contained in Iraq's "Full, Final and Complete Declaration". The report, however, referred to some elements of uncertainty in the completeness of that picture because of the inevitable limitations of any countrywide verification process. The report also indicated that the limitations in the verification process were not helped by Iraq's lack of full transparency in the provision of certain information and the absence of certain documentation.

19. As previously stated, greater transparency by Iraq would contribute considerably to clarifying the few remaining questions and concerns relevant to Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. Specific areas are the provision of certain documentary evidence of Iraq's actual technical achievements in nuclear weapon design and centrifuge development, the identification and location of the foreign national allegedly involved in an offer of assistance to Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme and the provision of concrete evidence of the

timing and modalities of its abandonment of that programme, including the adoption of the measures and the enactment of the penal laws referred to in paragraph 16 above.

20. It should be noted, however, that the uncertainties resulting from the above questions and concerns would not of themselves prevent the full implementation of the Agency's OMV plan. Indeed, such elements of uncertainty are factored into the plan, which takes fully into account the extensive technological expertise developed by Iraq in the course of its clandestine nuclear programme, particularly regarding the production of weapon-usable nuclear material. The plan is also predicated on the assumption that Iraq has the knowledge and technical expertise to exploit, for nuclear weapons purposes, any relevant materials or technology to which it may gain access in the future. Nonetheless, it must be recognized that Iraq's direct acquisition of weapon-usable material would present a serious technical challenge to OMV measures, and great reliance must continue to be placed on international controls.

21. To be effective, ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq as required by the relevant Security Council resolutions, must be comprehensive and intrusive. The OMV plan is an integral whole that can be meaningfully implemented only in its entirety. Its effective implementation is critically dependent upon the full exercise of the Agency's rights of full and free access enshrined in the plan.

22. IAEA continues to allocate most of its resources to the implementation of its OMV plan and to strengthen the technical content of its activities under the plan. However, Iraq's current suspension of cooperation with IAEA limits the Agency's right to full and free access. IAEA is currently unable to investigate further any aspects of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme or to ensure, through capable site inspections, that prohibited activities are not being carried out in Iraq, free from the risk of detection through direct inspection measures. As a result, the level of assurance provided under the plan is significantly reduced.

23. Should Iraq recommence full cooperation with IAEA, there would be no impediment to the full implementation of the Agency's OMV plan and, as part of that plan, the further investigation of the few remaining questions and concerns and any other aspect of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme arising out of new information coming to the Agency's attention. The assessment of Iraq's fulfilment of its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) remains the prerogative of the Security Council. However, since the inspection techniques and procedures employed by IAEA, in both its monitoring and its investigation activities, are essentially the same, the scope and content of the Agency's verification activities in Iraq would be largely unaffected should the Security Council decide that Iraq has complied with its obligations under paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991).

24. Finally, the attention of the Security Council is drawn to the eventual need to put into effect a mechanism, based upon paragraph 4 of resolution 699 (1991), to secure long-term funding for the implementation costs of the OMV plans of IAEA and the Special Commission.

Notes

[a] The previous consolidated reports of the Director General of IAEA were circulated as documents S/1996/261 of 11 April 1996, S/1996/833 of 7 October 1996, S/1997/297 of 11 April 1997, S/1997/779 of 8 October 1997 and S/1998/312 of 9 April 1998. Document S/1998/694, dated 27 July 1998, contained the text of an interim status report provided in response to the statement of the President of the Security Council dated 14 May 1998 (S/PRST/1998/11).

[b] On 24 September 1998, the IAEA Nuclear Monitoring Group was denied access to the Al Iraqi factory. The facility was originally announced to IAEA in February 1995 and had been inspected on eight previous occasions. Iraq has not been asked to provide routine semi-annual declarations for this facility.

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LETTER DATED 6 OCTOBER 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 6 October 1998 from Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, concerning the status of contracts under the memorandum of understanding.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 6 October 1998 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

More than four months after the start of phase IV under the memorandum of understanding of 20 May 1996 between Iraq and the Secretariat of the United Nations on the oil-for-food formula, practical experience of the processing the phase IV contracts for basic humanitarian needs of all kinds confirms the extent to which the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom in the 661 Committee are raising difficulties and obstacles to the sound and proper handling of such contracts. As a result, there have been major problems in securing the goods contracted for, and these have had adverse repercussions on the implementation of the terms of the memorandum of understanding and have robbed it of its humanitarian substance by preventing Iraqis from obtaining their basic needs, particularly in terms of food and medicine, thus causing thousands of deaths on a monthly basis.

The difficulties encountered in completing the circulation procedures for phase IV contracts are an extension of the obstacles raised to the processing of contracts for the three previous phases by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom in the Committee. Some contracts have yet to be fulfilled despite the fact that the period of time allocated for the phase in question has expired, all of them contracts for urgently needed humanitarian supplies included in the categorized lists annexed to the procurement and distribution plans approved by you for each of the phases of implementation under the memorandum of understanding.

Any observer can easily ascertain that contracts are placed on hold by the United States and United Kingdom representatives in the 661 Committee without there being any legal or technical basis for doing so. This is done on the basis of political considerations that are inimical to the people of Iraq and its national Government and are incompatible with the terms of the memorandum of understanding. Such hostile attitudes have dogged the implementation of the memorandum all the way from phase I to phase IV.

There are four phase I contracts, worth a total of 1.5 million dollars, on which a decision has yet to be made although this phase ended more than a year and a half ago. There are still 19 phase II contracts on hold with a total value of 12.2 million dollars; and 20 phase III contracts worth 25.5 million dollars are still pending although more than four months have elapsed since that phase ended. The contracts that are on hold include: four for foodstuffs; six for drugs and medical supplies; seven for spare parts for the electricity sector; two for educational supplies; and one for drinking-water treatment and sanitation supplies.

In connection with phase III, it has not only been a question of the obstacles raised by the United States and United Kingdom representatives in the 661 Committee to the approval of purchase orders, but there are also more than 50 other phase III contracts with a total value of some 74 million dollars for which the necessary financial backing is still awaited. The reason for this is

the dilatoriness of the United Nations mechanisms for reimbursing the 53 per cent account pertaining to the other governorates of Iraq for the cost of the food and medicine supplied to the three northern governorates (Irbil, Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah) from the 13 per cent account set aside for those governorates.

Despite the vital importance of the latter subject, it has yet to be addressed despite our constant urging that there is a need to remedy a situation that is making it impossible for Iraq to use the sums in question to back letters of credit for contracts that are ready. In another respect, the interests of the exporters involved in such contracts have been adversely affected and some have begun to renege on their contractual obligations or to demand revision of the prices agreed upon in the light of subsequent price changes in international markets for certain items.

The fate of phase IV contracts has been no better than that of contracts in previous phases. Thirty-one of them have been placed on hold, as follows:

Six, in the agricultural sector, for such items as sprayers, veterinary supplies, piping, tractors and spare parts;

Four in the food sector;

Five for the requirements of the food processing and distribution sector, mostly in the context of the ancillary food-supply services, including vehicles and spare parts for vehicles and for the railways;

Four for drugs and medical supplies;

Three in the education sector, for the importation of basic teaching equipment and supplies;

Two for irrigation supplies;

Two for drinking-water treatment and sanitation supplies;

Five, in the electricity sector, for spare parts and supplies for the renovation of electric power plants.

The last-mentioned category includes one contract for the renovation of the Nasiriyah electricity station at a cost of 70.5 million dollars and another for 75 million dollars, but they were placed on hold on the grounds that the necessary funds were are not available in the Iraq Account. You are well aware of the importance this station has for Iraq's electricity sector, which is vital to the operation of facilities meeting humanitarian needs and especially of hospitals, water-pumping stations, water purification plants, and the like.

Furthermore, contracts relating to the protein enhancement included in the procurement and distribution plan for phase IV under the memorandum of understanding are still pending four months later and there has been no full protein distribution to all citizens because of the anti-Iraq role played by the United States and United Kingdom representatives in the 661 Committee.

Funds are not available in the Iraq Account essentially because of the obstacles raised by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom in the 661 Committee to the processing of contracts relating to the renovation of oil-related infrastructure. These contracts are for key requirements for the operation and maintenance of the oil-related infrastructure, and they were drawn up on the basis of your letter dated 15 April 1998 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1998/330 and Corr.1) and of Security Council resolution 1175 (1998). Only seven of the 127 contracts registered with the 661 Committee have received financial backing, and the Committee placed 41 contracts on hold because of the positions taken by the United States and United Kingdom representatives.

The obstruction of the processing of contracts for the supply of the spare parts and equipment necessary to enable Iraq to increase its exports of petroleum and petroleum products to an extent sufficient to produce the sum of 5.2 billion dollars mentioned in paragraph 2 of resolution 1153 (1998) and the fall in world oil prices have meant that Iraq is unable to realize the oil revenues required to pay for the items included in the procurement and distribution plan approved by you. As a result, it is impossible for it to meet the basic humanitarian needs of all the sectors covered by that plan. Despite your aforesaid letter addressed to the President of the Security Council and Security Council resolution 1175 (1998) on the supply of necessary spare parts and equipment to the oil sector after verification by a panel of experts, the United States and United Kingdom representatives have not altered their hostile practice of obstructing the implementation of the memorandum of understanding and of dealing with this as with all the other provisions of the memorandum on the basis of their well-known hostile political motives, without any other consideration and unrestrained by human conscience. The spare parts that it had been agreed would be delivered within one month of the memorandum concerning oil were intended to make it possible for Iraq to pump the necessary quantities of oil. More than four months have passed since then, none of the spare parts have arrived, and most of the contracts concluded have been placed on hold by the United States and United Kingdom representatives in the 661 Committee. The obstacles and impediments that continue to be raised to the memorandum of understanding are proof of the persistence of the United States and United Kingdom administrations, in particular, in harming the people of Iraq and exposing it to disease and death.

In writing you this letter, I am confident that you and your aides shall spare no effort in monitoring the implementation of the memorandum of understanding and of the processing of the contracts relating to the procurement and distribution plans for each of its four phases and of those for the supply of the equipment necessary for the renovation of oil-related infrastructure. The latter constitutes a basic factor for increasing the resources that become available under the memorandum in order to meet the urgent humanitarian needs of Iraqis, who have for more than eight years now been suffering under an unjust blanket embargo that causes further deaths and increased suffering every day.

(Signed) Mohammad Said AL-SAHAF
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq

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General Assembly
Security Council

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GENERAL

A/53/468
S/1998/919
7 October 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-third session
Agenda item 45
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Identical letters dated 7 October 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 7 October 1998 addressed to you by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic State of Afghanistan concerning the present situation in Afghanistan.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 45, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dr. A. G. Ravan FARHÂDI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-29692 (E) 071098

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Annex

Letter dated 7 October 1998 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic State of Afghanistan presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, pursuant to document A/52/1006-S/1998/727, dated 7 August 1998, has the honour to communicate the following on the presence of Pakistani military personnel in Afghanistan.

The information collected herein represents data obtained by the intelligence services of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, statements by Pakistani officials and reports in Pakistani newspapers. The figures may bear plus or minus 15 per cent inaccuracy.

1. Pakistan began dispatching personnel into Taliban-occupied areas of Afghanistan in 1994, and their number has steadily increased.

(a) Officers and other servicemen of the Pakistani military intelligence services (ISI), who are in charge of tactical, organizational, administrative and intelligence aspects of military operations, of command and control and of political assignments - in sum those Pakistani officers who carry out the ISI-designated policy and schemes in Afghanistan - are currently estimated at 800 men.

(b) Members of Pakistani paramilitary organizations and groups, patronized by ISI:

(i) Harakat-ul-Ansar (renamed Harakat-ul-Mujahideen in order to conceal its past record of terrorism);

(ii) Sipah-i-Sahaaba (a terrorist group whose platform entails only the killing of Shi'as, now mobilized by ISI in Afghanistan against the Hazara ethnic group and other members of the Shi'a sect);

(iii) Other extremist groups with different denominations, Arab and Pakistani, under the ISI assignments.

Some of these combatants serve on a rotational basis between Afghanistan and other battlefields. The aforementioned groups and Pakistani ISI liaison officers to them total 3,800 men.

(c) Individuals and groups called "Sarhad Militia" (armed tribal units trained and mobilized since the time of the British rule by Pakistan) include about 2,500 men.

2. Pakistani units specializing in urban warfare and ready to "defend" Kabul City against an eventual liberation attempt from the north number 4,300 men.

3. Armed personnel called 'volunteers', who have entered Afghanistan since July 1998 after the sudden closure of madrassas (religious schools in the North-West Frontier Province and parts of Punjab subsequent to appeals for jihad, i.e. war against non-Muslims), who have been dispatched for the recent occupation assignments of the northern cities of Afghanistan and the majority of whom speak Punjabi, are estimated at 16,500 men.

4. New 'volunteer groups', which arrived in Afghanistan between 20 and 26 September 1998, represent 5,000 men. On 5 October 1995 it was learned that fresh groups of Pakistani mercenaries were recently ferried from Jalalabad to Ghorband and Khenjan.

The total number of Pakistanis in Afghanistan - excluding prisoners of war - comprise around 33,000 men.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/930
7 October 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 22 SEPTEMBER 1998 FROM THE COMMITTEE OF FIVE ESTABLISHED BY THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AT ITS MEETING HELD IN ADDIS ABABA ON 25 JANUARY 1995, DURING ITS SIXTY-FIRST SESSION, ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL*

The Committee of Five, established by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at its meeting held in Addis Ababa on 25 January 1995, during its sixty-first session, and entrusted with the follow-up to the dispute between the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland over Lockerbie, wishes to express to Your Excellency its deepest appreciation. The Committee of Five refers to the recent developments in this dispute: the acceptance by the United States and the United Kingdom of the proposals submitted by regional and international organizations to hold a trial for the two suspects in a neutral country (the Netherlands) and refers also to the declarations of the OAU Summit in Ouagadougou (8-10 June 1998). The Committee of Five, having studied these recent developments during its meeting held in New York on 22 September 1998, wishes to stress that it:

1. Commends the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for the flexibility it has demonstrated, as well as the civility and objectivity that characterized its conduct in dealing with this dispute and its acceptance of the trial of its citizens in a third neutral country, and expresses its total shock at the enormous material and moral losses suffered by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya as a result of the sanctions imposed upon it for all that period;

2. Expresses its satisfaction with the recent acceptance by the United States and the United Kingdom of what was proposed by the regional and international organizations four years ago, and regrets the delay of this acceptance for all this time;

3. Reconfirms its continued support of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya's position, which aims at insuring a just and fair trial for the suspects, and calls upon the United States, the United Kingdom and the

* Received on 7 October 1998.

Netherlands to enter into direct negotiations with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or, through the Secretary-General, to implement the initiative referred to in Security Council resolution 1192 (1998) of 27 August 1998, including the arrangements for the trial and security guarantees relating to the suspects;

4. Affirms its total solidarity and support for the legitimate Libyan demands:

(a) That an agreement be reached by all the parties guaranteeing no surrender, no transfer and no transport of the two suspects to either the United States or the United Kingdom for any reason whatsoever; and, in case of their conviction, that they serve their term in either the Netherlands or the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

(b) That an agreement be reached by all parties on limiting, clarifying and specifying the witnesses needed from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

(c) That an agreement be reached by all parties guaranteeing the right of the suspects - legal, religious, personal, social - during all the phases of the trial, as well as their safety and security during their travel to and from the Netherlands and during their stay there;

(d) That the beginning of the trial must be the end of this dispute, for the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has already responded to all the demands of the Security Council. The sanctions should be lifted upon the appearance of the two suspects before the trial.

The Committee of Five, in submitting the above, calls upon the Security Council to take it into consideration when dealing with this issue.

We have the honour to request that the present letter be circulated and issued as a document of the Security Council.

For: The Republic of Cameroon

For: Tunisia

For: The Republic of Zimbabwe

For: Ghana

For: The Republic of Uganda

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/931
8 October 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN ANGOLA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 1195 (1998) of 15 September 1998, in which the Council, inter alia, decided to assess the overall situation in Angola and take action on the future role of the United Nations on the basis of a report and recommendations to be submitted by me no later than 8 October 1998. It covers developments since my last report, dated 7 September 1998 (S/1998/838).

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. The period under review was marked by several developments which seriously threatened the continuation of the Angolan peace process as envisaged in the Lusaka Protocol (S/1994/1441, annex). The most significant among those negative developments was the breaking by the Government of all contacts with the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) led by Mr. Jonas Savimbi and the Government's recognition of the leadership of the UNITA Renovation Committee (see S/1998/838, para. 10), as the only legitimate interlocutor for the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. Although some UNITA members in the National Assembly and the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation have dissociated themselves from Mr. Savimbi, the UNITA leadership in Andulo has insisted that it remains the legitimate partner in the peace process, thus creating a conflicting situation over the representation of UNITA in the Joint Commission and preventing that important body from effectively carrying out its duties.

3. My Special Representative, Mr. Issa B. Y. Diallo, in close consultation with the representatives of the three observer States, Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, continued to maintain contacts with all concerned in an attempt to foster a spirit of dialogue and avoid a total rupture in the peace process. On 9 September 1998, during his meeting with President José Eduardo dos Santos, he emphasized the need for the United Nations to remain in contact with Mr. Savimbi and his group, in order to explain to them the serious dangers facing the peace process and, at the same time, ascertain their position and concerns on the future of the Lusaka Protocol. Mr. Diallo

also underlined the importance of guaranteeing the safety of the personnel of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) and other international personnel. The President informed my Special Representative that he saw no utility in future contacts with Mr. Savimbi and that his Government would assume its responsibility in conformity with the wishes of the Angolan people. In this context, the President expressed his desire for MONUA to support the efforts of the Government and those of the States of the subregion and work with the Renovation Committee to conclude the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.

4. In accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1195 (1998) and in view of the obvious need to maintain contacts with those who control the situation on the ground, my Special Representative requested an appointment with Mr. Savimbi for 21 September 1998. This was communicated to UNITA in Bailundo, together with a request for a written guarantee for the security of my Special Representative and his team. The Government was also notified of the planned meeting with Mr. Savimbi and was requested to extend its cooperation. While UNITA responded positively to that request, a Government representative declined to provide any security guarantees to Mr. Diallo and even warned him that the Government would cease all contacts with the Special Representative if he undertook the trip.

5. In these circumstances, and in response to his letter of 10 September 1998 (S/1998/847), I sent a message to President dos Santos on 18 September, seeking his Government's cooperation with all Angolan parties, old and new, whose cooperation was vital for the effective resolution of the crisis, and reiterated the need to maintain dialogue. I also appealed to all parties concerned to reject military action and to refrain from any other action which might jeopardize further the Lusaka process. My Special Representative immediately requested an audience with the President for further consultations, and is still waiting to be received. However, at a meeting held on 2 October, the Vice-Minister for External Relations of Angola, Mr. Joao Miranda, assured me that President dos Santos would reply to my letter and would receive my Special Representative soon. In the meantime, Mr. Diallo continued to meet in Luanda with various representatives of Angolan civil society, including political parties and religious groups, in order to ascertain their views and to urge them to actively support peace and national reconciliation. He met with the leaders of the UNITA Renovation Committee, who conveyed to him their determination to assist in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.

6. The Renovation Committee has been active in many provinces of the country, appealing to UNITA members to join its ranks and give up their weapons. The Government has been assisting the Committee in setting up provincial offices and holding political rallies, and was instrumental in transferring control over UNITA headquarters in Luanda to members of the Committee. It should be noted that, at their summit in Mauritius on 14 September, the leaders of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) expressed support to the new UNITA group and characterized Mr. Savimbi's behaviour as that of a "war criminal". The statement also contained an appeal to the United Nations, the three observer States and the international community to recognize the UNITA Renovation Committee. In another regional meeting held at Libreville on 24 September, a number of Central African leaders also expressed support for the UNITA Renovation Committee.

7. On 23 September 1998, the Government lifted the suspension it had imposed on 1 September on the four ministers of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation and seven vice-ministers designated by UNITA. On the same day, however, the President dismissed one UNITA minister and one vice-minister. In response, the UNITA leadership in Bailundo issued a communiqué asserting that the suspension of its members was a flagrant violation of the Lusaka Protocol and stating that any attempt to reinstate them or change the membership of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation should be done only with the consent of UNITA. In a related development, on 25 September, the Permanent Commission of the National Assembly decided to request the UNITA Renovation Committee to replace 15 of the 70 UNITA deputies by 15 October 1998, by which time the Assembly also intends to consider the abrogation of the law - adopted pursuant to the Lusaka Protocol - granting a special status to Mr. Savimbi as the leader of the largest opposition party. On 26 September, 53 UNITA deputies signed a declaration seeking clarification of the decision of the Permanent Commission and reaffirming that all 70 deputies who had assumed their duties in the Assembly in 1997 constituted the UNITA parliamentary group under the leadership of Mr. Chivukuvuku. In a recent statement to the press, Mr. Chivukuvuku declared that, although he had severed contacts with Mr. Savimbi, he did not intend to join the UNITA Renovation Committee.

8. In the meantime, on 24 September, the Foreign Ministers of the three observer States issued a statement (S/1998/916) in New York, stressing that there could be no military solution to the conflict in Angola and underlining the validity of the Lusaka Protocol. They demanded that UNITA comply unconditionally with it obligations, and expressed support for my efforts and those of my Special Representative to reinvigorate the peace process through consultations with the Government and UNITA. The Troika also made public the joint letter they had addressed to Mr. Savimbi on the same day. On 6 September, my Special Representative dispatched a message to Mr. Savimbi recommending specific steps to put the peace process back on track.

III. MILITARY AND SECURITY ASPECTS

9. The security situation in Angola continued to deteriorate, primarily as a result of persistent UNITA attacks on strategic locations. The Government launched counter-attacks in several parts of the country, including Maquela Do Zombo and Puri in Uigé Province, Luremo and Milando in Lunda Norte Province and other locations. The Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) appear to be determined to defend the key provincial capitals, while seeking to recover control over the diamond-mining areas in Lunda Norte and Malange Provinces. The apparent use of air power by FAA in Malange and the Lundas regions has also contributed to the intensification of the conflict.

10. In the north, UNITA forces, allegedly assisted by armed elements from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, occupied several locations during the first half of September. In Malange, their elements continued to control several areas north and south of the main provincial highway, thus cutting off the main route between Malange and the diamond-producing area of Luzamba in Lunda Norte. In the most serious incident involving he civilian population since the attack on Mina Bula (S/1998/723, para. 10), at least 89 people were killed when an

armed group stormed the diamond-mining settlement of Luremo (Lunda Norte Province) on 31 August. The MONUA investigation indicated that the killings took place during the occupation of the locality by UNITA forces. There were also reports of numerous ambushes in Hùila, Benguela and Huambo provinces and mine incidents in Bié, Moxico and Lunda Sul Provinces.

11. The build-up of FAA troops in Bela Vista/Vila Nova in Huambo Province, as well as Cangandala in Malange Province and Kuito in Bié Province, is believed to represent a threat against the UNITA strongholds in the central highlands. It is widely assumed that FAA is preparing for a possible major military action in Uíge, Malange, Lunda Norte, Huambo and Bié Provinces.

12. On 16 September 1998, a United Nations convoy comprising MONUA and World Food Programme vehicles was ambushed 25 kilometres north of Lucala in Cuanza Norte Province. As a result, one local MONUA international contractor employee was killed and three others were injured. The courageous and timely intervention by the escorting United Nations troops prevented the attackers, who were dressed in FAA uniforms, from looting and killing more people. MONUA road convoys were temporarily suspended, but have resumed on routes that are determined to be relatively safe. However, monitoring and investigations conducted by MONUA observers continued by air, despite obstructions and the uncooperative attitude of UNITA and often of the Government authorities. MONUA has also taken stringent measures to enhance the security of its team sites and ensure the safety of its personnel. Some of the team sites, in particular in the UNITA strongholds of Andulo and Bailundo, are particularly vulnerable to possible military operations. I should like once again to remind the parties about their ultimate responsibility for the safety and the security of all United Nations personnel.

IV. POLICE ASPECTS

13. The civilian police component of MONUA continues, to the extent possible, to perform the various tasks described in my previous reports to the Council. Civilian police observers monitored the activities of the Angolan National Police (ANP) and, in collaboration with the human rights component of MONUA, investigated human rights violations and visited arrested persons and detention centres. Civilian police activities were also crucial for monitoring the security arrangements for UNITA leaders, particularly in Luanda.

14. The widespread hostilities continued to exert a heavy toll on the general law and order situation in the country. According to MONUA reports, the attitude of some ANP personnel towards the civilian population in areas formerly controlled by UNITA cannot be described as neutral. In a few cases, ANP personnel admitted that they were detaining people simply because they were UNITA members. In addition, MONUA is still seeking the Government's cooperation in initiating a training programme for ANP on internationally accepted police procedures and standards.

15. With the worsening security situation, the implementation of the important task of disarming the civilian population has virtually ceased. Moreover, there have been increasing reports of Government recruitment of civilians into local

"defence brigades", which are not controlled closely by the authorities. The civilian police also conducted regular patrols and visits to checkpoints manned by ANP and FAA, with a view to preventing the obstruction of free circulation of people and goods. Recently, the number of those checkpoints has increased significantly.

16. The latest political developments have also created anxiety about security among UNITA members in Luanda still loyal to Mr. Savimbi (also see para. 18 below). The relevant department of ANP has continued to provide generally acceptable but inconsistent security protection to UNITA representatives in the capital. The General Commander of ANP reaffirmed to MONUA that the Angolan police would protect high-ranking UNITA members, irrespective of their political loyalties. However, in what appears to be a premeditated attack, on 2 October 1998, the vehicle of Mr. Chivukuvuku (see para. 7 above) was shot at in front of his residence in Luanda. Mr. Chivukuvuku's wife and bodyguard who were in the car were not injured. The representatives of the Troika and my Special Representative issued a statement strongly condemning this criminal act. According to reports, the leader of the Renovation Committee requested the authorities to withdraw the security personnel from the residences of those UNITA deputies who do not support the Renovation Committee.

V. HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS

17. The civilian population has continued to bear the brunt of military operations by both sides. Over the past few months, indiscriminate as well as summary killings, torture and harassment, abductions, destruction of property, forcible displacement and restrictions on freedom of movement have been reported in the course of attacks targeting entire villages. However, the number of abuses appears to have decreased slightly in September. Although in some cases it is impossible to identify the attackers, a significant number of the attacks have been perpetrated by UNITA elements. Civilian communities have also suffered at the hands of some FAA and ANP elements, including pillaging for food. Attacks or anticipation of attacks have continued to result in the massive displacement of whole communities, whose members have sometimes been subjected to further abuses. At such times, principles of humanitarian law are especially important as they seek to protect the most vulnerable groups - those who are not involved in military operations - from direct or indiscriminate attacks or being forced to flee.

18. In the light of the political developments, MONUA has also been concerned about the safety and security of UNITA members and party officials in Government-controlled areas who have not declared their support for the UNITA Renovation Committee. Recently, in Saurimo, a UNITA detainee died in custody, possibly for lack of medical care. Several UNITA members were found dead on 1 October, apparently the victims of an ANP revenge attack. In spite of all this, there are conscientious authorities throughout the country that are trying to improve respect for human rights.

19. The Prosecutor General of the Republic and the Ministry of Justice have taken some important initiatives to ameliorate the situation. In the provinces, Government officials often persist in their work, despite acute shortages of

resources. MONUA is collaborating closely with Government ministries and local authorities in initiatives to strengthen the law enforcement and judicial systems. The MONUA Human Rights Division has continued to assist non-governmental organizations, including the churches and professional associations, in developing their capacity to promote human rights. Human rights officers also supported commendable local initiatives to create networks of human rights promoters and defenders, by teaching at training workshops and providing technical advice and materials. In collaboration with MONUA, an Angolan theatre group has written 12 plays about different human rights, performed them for national television and in the provinces and given training sessions.

20. Respect for human rights remains essential in times of political crisis. It would be important to continue the Human Rights Division so that its programmes may have a lasting impact. The short-term and long-term objectives are complementary: addressing human rights abuses as they occur and encouraging prevention and protection through institution-building projects. In close collaboration with the Government, it is necessary to continue to assist in making the Angolan law-enforcement agencies more professional, the justice system more responsive and the prison system more humane. It is also important to continue to report on the human rights situation so that problems may be understood and solutions suggested.

VI. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

21. As a result of the pervasive insecurity and instability, the humanitarian situation in Angola continues to deteriorate. The protracted conflict has forced the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians and has contributed to widespread lawlessness, which in turn has compelled thousands of others to flee their homes. The humanitarian community has now confirmed that there are over 220,000 newly displaced persons since the beginning of 1998. This brings the total number of internally displaced Angolans to a staggering 1.3 million, or over 10 per cent of the country's population.

22. Lack of adequate access continues to impede the assessment and monitoring of the vulnerable groups. Despite the tremendous efforts of humanitarian relief workers to reach those groups, access to them is restricted because of insecurity, the suspension of escorts provided by MONUA infantry units, and newly laid landmines. It has also become increasingly difficult to obtain clearance from UNITA for visits to the areas it controls. While sufficient food stocks exist in the country, lack of access has prevented the distribution of food to the most vulnerable persons in many provinces. The absence of suitable national or community-based social services and local support mechanisms also contributes to the worsening of the situation. This is reflected in the shocking fact that almost 30 per cent of Angolan children do not survive beyond the age of five. The severe humanitarian condition is further compounded by the drought in the southern provinces, which has affected over 300,000 persons.

23. In view of these constraints, humanitarian organizations have been obliged to airlift relief supplies to the needy populations in Saurimo, Luena and Andrade. Those operations have diverted the already limited resources from

other important humanitarian activities. According to recent assessments, it is expected that the humanitarian situation will continue to deteriorate, unless there is an early resolution to the present crisis. The Government of Angola does not have sufficient capacity to meet the most urgent basic needs of its civilians and I am extremely concerned that unless relief organizations are provided with secure access to the vulnerable populations, the dire situation of those groups may become intractable.

24. Notwithstanding the current difficult conditions prevailing in Angola, the Government and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have agreed that the suspension of the demining programme throughout the country should be avoided at all costs. However, owing to the deterioration of the general security environment, special contingency measures have been adopted. The possibility of temporarily relocating all demining brigades to safer areas is currently being studied. The worsening of administrative and logistical support to the demining brigades in the provinces has led to the cessation of operations by all but two national brigades out of seven established earlier. International non-governmental organizations involved face similar constraints and, as a result, have also redeployed their personnel. It is foreseen that a team composed of representatives of UNDP, the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Mine Action Service will visit Angola to review the country programme in November.

VII. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

25. The Angolan economy continued to show signs of deep stagnation: foreign receipts from oil have been declining, public budget allocations have been revised downward and public domestic debt has increased. The economic difficulties, compounded by the low price of oil in the world market, are seriously affecting key economic variables, such as consumer prices, foreign exchange rates and the fiscal deficit, among others. The decision to implement a weekly devaluation of the local currency by 4.5 per cent was intended to narrow the gap between the parallel and the official market exchange rates.

26. The drop in oil prices and the diversion of resources from investment in productive sectors to the national security needs have led to a further reduction of planned expenditure for the social sector. As a consequence, some social infrastructure rehabilitation projects launched early this year could be halted. Social problems are also becoming increasingly acute with the deterioration of the military situation in vast areas of the country. Following the discussions held in Washington at the end of August 1998, the Government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have agreed on the implementation of a programme aimed at increasing the Government's ability to effectively implement its medium-term programme for stabilization and economic recovery for 1998-2000. The programme may be replaced by an enhanced structural adjustment facility in 1999, if the Government and IMF recognize that reforms aimed at improving transparency in the oil accounts, launching a privatization programme and liberalizing trade operations have substantially moved forward.

VIII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

27. As indicated in my previous report (S/1998/838), pending the submission of further recommendations on the United Nations presence in Angola, the General Assembly, by its resolution 52/8 C of 26 June 1998, appropriated an initial amount of US $43.6 million gross, equivalent to a monthly rate of $10.9 million gross, for the maintenance of MONUA for the period from 1 July to 31 October 1998.

28. Pending a decision by the Security Council on the mandate of MONUA beyond 15 October 1998, I am requesting the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in entering into commitments for the maintenance of MONUA in the amount of $10.9 million gross for the month of November 1998.

29. Should the Council authorize the extension of MONUA as indicated in paragraph 34 below, I intend to submit the revised budget for the period from 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999 for consideration by the General Assembly at the main part of its fifty-third session.

30. As at 30 September 1998, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNAVEM/MONUA special account for the period since the inception of the Mission to 15 October 1998 amounted to $137.8 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at 30 September 1998 was $1,802.3 million.

IX. OBSERVATIONS

31. I continue to be seriously concerned about the apparent unravelling of the peace process in Angola, a country where the United Nations has made enormous efforts for peace, not to mention the ultimate sacrifices made by peacekeepers.

32. The international community has agreed that UNITA and its leadership in Bailundo bear the primary responsibility for the present crisis raging in Angola. Only the unconditional implementation of all crucial elements of the Lusaka Protocol, particularly full demilitarization and the extension of State administration throughout the whole country, can rescue the peace process. Such irreversible steps, accompanied by immediate measures by UNITA, in coordination with the Government of Angola and the United Nations, to bring the peace process to a conclusion will avert further human suffering and devastation in Angola.

33. A political settlement, based on the Acordos de Paz (S/22609 of 17 May 1991), the Lusaka Protocol and relevant Security Council resolutions, remains the most viable means to restore normalcy in Angola. I therefore call on the Government and, in particular, on UNITA to fulfil their responsibilities before their people and the international community and to take resolute steps to avert another full-scale war. To this end, it is important to keep the door to dialogue open, in particular with those who could make a concrete and decisive contribution to the peace process. Accordingly, I have instructed my Special Representative to maintain contacts with all concerned, old parties and new, in an attempt to give peace a chance. On the basis of the mandate

contained in Security Council resolution 1195 (1998), I asked Mr. Diallo to visit Mr. Savimbi to deliver the strong message of the international community and to ascertain his intentions concerning the speediest implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. The Government should facilitate this contact, which would help to establish the real intentions of UNITA.

34. In view of the considerations set out above and keeping in mind the unstable situation in the region, I recommend that the Security Council extend MONUA for another short period of up to six weeks, in order to give my Special Representative an additional opportunity to revive the stalled peace process. In the meantime, the prevailing insecurity demands that additional measures be taken to protect United Nations personnel and reconfigure the deployment of MONUA on the ground if needed.

5. When establishing MONUA, by its resolution 1118 (1997) of 30 June 1997, the Security Council mandated the Mission to assist the Angolan parties in consolidating peace and national reconciliation, enhancing confidence building and creating an environment conducive to long-term stability. If, after the expiration of the proposed extension, the pattern of UNITA non-compliance with those obligations continues, if the dialogue between the parties remains elusive and my Special Representative is unable to maintain meaningful contacts, and MONUA remains obstructed in its verification activities, I may have no alternative for the Security Council but to propose taking the course of action described below.

36. At the beginning of December, the United Nations would proceed with the immediate readjustment of its presence throughout the country, its deployment being concentrated mostly in and around six regional headquarters, as well as Luanda and the logistical base in Lobito. The reconfiguration would be conducted gradually, so as to fully protect United Nations personnel and property, and would be completed by the end of January 1999.

37. On the humanitarian side, the combined effects of any resumption of hostilities and the ensuing hunger and growing poverty would lead to a far-reaching human tragedy in Angola. Therefore, special urgent measures must be taken to enable the humanitarian operations to perform their tasks in accordance with internationally accepted principles. Security clearances with all parties concerned and urgent additional funding are the basic requirements to avoid further worsening of the present emergency situation. In the next few weeks, I intend to commence consultations aimed at defining the modalities for the increased flow of humanitarian assistance commensurate with the dramatic needs on the ground. I call, once again, on the donor community to respond generously to the growing humanitarian crisis in Angola.

Annex

United Nations Observer Mission in Angola: contributions as at 5 October 1998

Country	Military observers	Civilian police observers	Staff officers[a]	Troops	Total
Argentina	-	15	-	-	15
Bangladesh	3	21	1	-	25
Brazil	4	12	2	-	18
Bulgaria	3	20	-	-	23
Congo	2	-	-	-	2
Egypt	3	15	-	-	18
France	3	-	-	-	3
Gambia	-	4	-	-	4
Ghana	3	6	-	-	9
Guinea-Bissau	2	4	-	-	6
Hungary	3	8	-	-	11
India	5	11	8	138	162
Jordan	3	27	-	-	30
Kenya	3	6	-	-	9
Malaysia	4	26	-	-	30
Mali	3	21	-	-	24
Namibia	-	-	2	138	140
New Zealand	3	-	-	-	3
Nigeria	4	20	-	-	24
Norway	3	-	-	-	3
Pakistan	3	-	1[b]	-	4
Poland	4	-	-	-	4
Portugal	4	43	4	61	112
Romania	-	-	4	138	142
Russian Federation	3	-	3	99	105
Senegal	4	-	-	-	4
Slovakia	3	-	-	-	3
Spain	-	14	-	-	14
Sweden	3	19	-	-	22

Country	Military observers	Civilian police observers	Staff officers[a]	Troops	Total
United Republic of Tanzania	-	3	-	-	3
Ukraine	3	2	1	-	6
Uruguay	3	31	3	-	37
Zambia	3	22	8	-	33
Zimbabwe	3	22	4	-	29
Total	90	372	41	574	1 077

[a] Including military police.

[b] A military specialist in the demining school.



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October 1998

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UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/53/475
S/1998/932
8 October 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-third session
Agenda items 39, 40 and 85
QUESTION OF PALESTINE
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE WHOLE
QUESTION OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
IN ALL THEIR ASPECTS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Letter dated 8 October 1998 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Yesterday, despite ongoing diplomatic efforts aimed at rescuing the peace process and recurrent appeals for a cessation of actions that pre-empt final status negotiations and severely damage the peace process, the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu, announced further construction of settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory. More radically, in a step tantamount to a de facto annexation, the Prime Minister announced the transformation of a settlement into a city.

At a settlement called "Ariel", which is located in the West Bank, Mr. Netanyahu declared, "We are building and will continue to build". The Prime Minister was there participating in a ceremony conferring city status on the settlement. In this regard, he stated, "When we declare Ariel as a city, as we do today, we thus announce that this is a permanent place. This place will be part of Israel in any final status agreement in the future". Further, he stated, "I would like to see Ariel double in size. We will continue at this pace and build up this city more and more and more".

All Israeli settlement activities are illegal under international law. They violate the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, numerous Security Council resolutions and the resolutions of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly. The step of de facto annexation, however, is even more dangerous and necessitates immediate condemnation by the international community. The actions and the statements made by the Prime Minister in this regard are absolutely unacceptable, they have no legal validity and they do not and cannot change the status of the occupied territory.

In addition, yesterday, in the city of Al-Khalil (Hebron), a cornerstone was laid by the Israeli occupying authorities for future construction of a settlement in Tel Rumeida. This illegal, provocative act comes at a time of increasing tension and conflict in the city, including the criminal activities of Israeli settlers. Just yesterday, a Palestinian youth, twenty-one year old Amjad Al-Natshe, was killed by Israeli troops during clashes in Al-Khalil. More than twenty other Palestinians were also injured during those clashes.

These are serious developments, which require the attention of, and action by, the Security Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 39, 40 and 85 of the fifty-third session, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dr. Nasser AL-KIDWA
Permanent Observer of Palestine
to the United Nations

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/933
8 October 1998
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 6 OCTOBER 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that violations of Iraq's airspace by United States aircraft continued between 16 and 30 September 1998 and that the aircraft in question carried out reconnaissance and engaged in acts of provocation, as set forth in the annex hereto.

Your intervention is requested with a view to bringing a halt to actions that, as flagrant violations of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, pose a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq.

These actions continue to alarm the civilian population and to cause serious damage to private and public property. The Republic of Iraq affirms its right to seek legal compensation for the damage being inflicted on the Iraqi people and the Iraqi State by these actions.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Violations and damage caused, 16-30 September 1998

1. In the northern region 122 sorties were flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres over the following cities and towns: Dohuk, Mosul, Amadiyah, Aqrah, Zakho, Irbil, Tall Afar, Tall Kayf, Sinjar, Bi'aj and Rawanduz.

2. In the southern region 672 sorties were flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres over the following Iraqi cities and towns: Nasiriyah, Samawah, Artawi, Ushbayjah, Jalibah, Salman, Busayyah, Qurnah, Chabaish, Shinafiyah, Rumaythah, Basrah, Shatrah, Qal'at Salih, Maymunah, Rifa'i, Kut, Mu'aniyah, Nukhayb, Ali al-Gharbi, Jabal Sanam, Diwaniyah, Lasaf, Safwan, Amarah and Umm Qasr.

3. Eleven violations were committed by TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at altitudes of 20,000 metres and at speeds of 600 kilometres per hour.

4. At 1400 and 1430 hours on 11 September United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

5. At 1005 and 1015 hours on 13 September United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over Umm Qasr.

6. At 1030, 1035, 1100, 1125, 1705 and 1730 hours on 14 September United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over the Umm Qasr and Khawr al-Zubayr areas.

7. At 1221, 1311 and 1325 hours on 16 September United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over the Umm Qasr area.

8. At 1700 hours on 17 September the Iraqi freighter Al-Bay'ah, which belongs to the State Enterprise for Iraqi Water Transport and had been loaded with wheat at the port of Umm Qasr, was on its way to the Ma'qil port at Basrah by way of the Khawr Abd Allah - Shatt al-Arab Channel. A helicopter from a United States frigate on station in the northern Arabian Gulf circled the vessel and hovered over it several times in order to take photographs. The pilot of the helicopter communicated with the ship's master and instructed him to change course.

9. At 1435 hours on 17 September a formation of United States aircraft broke the sound barrier over the Ayn Zalah area.

10. At 1730 hours on 22 September United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over the Umm Qasr area.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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8 October 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 8 OCTOBER 1998 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, and in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, I have the honour to bring the following to your attention.

At 6.30 a.m., local time, the Taliban militia launched an attack, using mortar and Dush-K, against the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran between the Ibrahim Khani and Kondeh Souz border posts in Khorassan Province. The Iranian armed forces took some limited and proportionate measures, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, to repel the Taliban attack. At 9.30 a.m., the cross-border attack by the Taliban militia, constituting a flagrant aggression and provocation, was repelled and military operation was halted.

The armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran used maximum self-restraint in response to the Taliban cross-border mortar attack, in deference to the diplomatic efforts of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, who was to arrive in Islamabad from Tehran today, in order to engage the Taliban in implementation of Security Council resolution 1193 (1998) without further delay.

I should be grateful if you could have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hadi NEJAD-HOSSEINIAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-29887 (E) 081098